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I don't know where to start except with the thought of life.
It's as good a point to start as any.
What I thought I ought to do is review for you some of the phenomena
that have been occurring in the past couple of years and some of the
phenomena that have been occurring recently just so that you are up to
date on what is happening in various Federal Government Committees,
NIH and areas such as this and where one can foresee a number of prob-
lems. I want to remind you very briefly of a few key fetal physiology facts
that are commonly brought up as questions in anything to do with abor-
tion, or right to life amendments.
I want to remind you first of all, that fertilization of the human egg
does not occur in the womb, but in the tube. Do people know what I mean
by the womb and the tube? The womb looks like my body, tubes are kind
of like two extended arms, and if I had two footballs in my hands you'd
have two ovaries and you would get some idea of how things work. So all
right, fertilization then occurs in the inside of the tube and it then takes
seven days for that fertilized egg to come down the tube and implant in
the womb. I want to remind you that it is only when that fertilized egg
implants into that womb that we can tell that the woman is pregnant
because it is only at that point that this fetus begins to produce a sub-
stance, a hormone, which is the hormone that we test for in pregnancy
tests. So what we do is take a blood sample from the mother and by testing
for the hormones in it we can tell that there is a fetus around because he's
sending us these signals through his hormones. And what is of some im-
portance is that it is nine days after fertilization that we can first tell
whether a pregnancy is there. That is by modern techniques not yet univer-
sally available, but which are accurate, called radioimmuno assay, for
those who want it spelled out. What this means, in essence then, is that
we can test for the presence of a fetus before a mother has ever missed a
menstrual period. So within the month itself in which the pregnancy oc-
curs and before she ever misses a period we can tell whether a fetus is there,
if we use high grade laboratories. If not, then pregnancy tests will become
positive only after the woman has missed a period and that would be
something like one week to two weeks after she has missed a period. It's
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important I think that you know that from the ninth day onward it is
theoretically possible to test for pregnancy and in the first nine days it is
not possible to test for pregnancy. This simply means that it is up to that
time impossible to prove that a woman is pregnant.
I want to give you a few other key points in the course of pregnancy
that are important. Important, somewhat, I think is the fact that in the
third week of pregnancy, a spontaneous fetal heart starts. Why do I con-
sider that important? Because by analogy of beginnings and ends of life it
is at least unlikely that we would say at the end of life that we would
pronounce somebody dead rather than alive if they had a spontaneous
heart beat. We have had difficultues, as you know, in the laws of transplan-
tation to determine whether there is a spontaneous heart beat. This is the
result of the fact that when you have somebody on a machine and maintain
their respiration, the question becomes whether such a heart beat should
be considered spontaneous. And consequently it is in those cases that
people have tested for brain waves, the brain wave absence telling you this
heart beat will never recur spontaneously. it is actually an artifact, if you
like, from the fact that you are being put on the respirator that is maintain-
ing your respiration. How does this apply to the fetus? The fetus has a
spontaneous heart beat from the third week. But it is difficult to know
what his respiration status is because he gets his oxygen via the placenta
from the mother. And now the question is, do you want to consider the
placenta as an artificial respirator or not. And nobody has ever given a
good definition of respiration. Namely, whether that is something that
requires movement of the chest and expansion of the lung, yea or nay, or
whether you can talk about respiration as the intake of oxygen. In that
case, the placenta would be, in a sense, a lung.
The next stage I want to bring up for a moment is an eight week stage,
the eighth week stage being of some importance because the electroence-
phalogram or the brain waves begin at that point. Of some importance,
because there have been legal cases, although I know nothing about the
law, but I think there have been legal cases in which it has been ruled that
if there is no spontaneous respiration-if a patient is on a respirator, has
a spontaneous heartbeat, and is being maintained with that heartbeat
through the respirator, but has no EEG, that is to say, the EEG is flat then
the heart may be removed for transplant purposes. In other words, that
definition of death would entail the absence of an electroencephalogram
with the absence of spontaneous heartbeat, with the added proviso that the
heart may beat only as a result of the lung respirator and is then not
considered spontaneous. It has led some people to say that if there are only
two conditions in which you can be, namely alive or dead, and if the courts
rule that the presence of an electroencephalogram at the end of life denotes
life, then one ought to at least say that from the eighth week in fetal life
there is life by the same criteria as are presently used at the end of life.
An important point that you ought to be aware of is the thirteenth
week of pregnancy. That is only technically important to an obstetrician,
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if one would call him that, who would be interested in doing an abortion.
Prior to the thirteenth week methodology can be used which is "relatively
safe." After the thirteenth week the danger in abortion markedly changes
with two procedures then being used. Either a small cesarean section to
take the fetus out, which is called a hysterotomy, or else the injection of a
salt solution into the uterus which causes the woman in time to go into
labor and expel a dead fetus.
The next critical point in medical language is the twentieth week of
pregnancy, at which point the obstetrical profession no longer talks about
abortions, whether spontaneous, induced or whatever. After the twentieth
week we talk about premature deliveries. It is at about the twentieth week
that the fetus will weigh someplace between 400 and 500 grams. And as
you know the smallest infant that ever survived weighed 393 grams. Be-
tween the twentieth and twenty-eighth weeks the chances of survival are
10%. Obviously, the longer one goes the greater the chance of survival.
The court has held in general that in the first to the thirteenth week,
by virtue of the fact that abortion at that point is a safer procedure than
to go through with childbirth, States may not interfere with the perform-
ance of an abortion as far as I read it. The right to privacy at that point
operates. A word about the misuse of statistics. There are two classical
examples of misuse of statistics nowadays. One is the statement, "the pill
is safer than childbirth." I happen to think the pill is a very good contra-
ceptive, but for reasons other than that it is safer than childbirth. For
the following reason: Anybody who wants to go on the pill comes into
the doctor's office and gets a physical workup. If they have a bad heart,
bad lungs, bad liver, bad kidney, tumors or whatever you like, you are
not allowed to go on the pill. Right. So all the "sickies" are off the pill,
all the "wellies" are on the pill and then the data comes out that the
"wellies" do better than the "sickies." Well, this is of course a terrible
misuse of statistics, but it's the kind of thing that gets bandied around.
The same thing is true for saying that an abortion is safer than child-
birth, on several grounds. First of all to have a childbirth you must
live for nine months, because that is as long as it takes. To have an
abortion, you need only live for two months or three months and it
stands to reason if you live for nine months you have a larger risk of
dying than if you live for two months. I think 90 year olds know that
indeed that's the way it is. So, that's problem number one. The second
problem is that should one die prior to an abortion being performed, you
are then counted not as an abortion mortality but as a birth and pregnancy
mortality. So that fundamentally, what one ought to do when one makes
such a statement is that one should compare the procedure of abortion
with the procedure of childbirth. Unfortunately what happens is if you die
from anything else in pregnancy you are assigned to the death category of
the childbirth and not of the abortion. The third problem is that the
samples are not comparable, because any woman who is severely ill with
heart disease or with whatever else you want, who wants to get pregnant
and who refuses to get an abortion is automatically assigned to the child-
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birth death statistics. So once again the childbirth death statistics at the
present time deal with a group that contains many "sickies" and "sickies"
who decided "By God I am going to have a child." So what is happening
here is that comparative statements are made in which the death of the
procedure of abortion is compared with the whole of the death that has to
do with maternity regardless of whether people are well or not and it is just
simply lousy use of statistics. But I don't think law schools probably teach
epidemiology, that's probably one of the problems. Now as I understand
it the courts presently state that beyond the thirteenth week, by virtue of
the fact that at that time it is agreed that the abortion procedure carries a
higher risk than the childbirth procedure, the states are entitled to regulate
where these abortions will be performed. And at the twenty-seventh, or
thereabouts week, and I don't know where they drew it from, the states can
evince an interest in the fetus as such. What is to me the most interesting
fact about the whole decision is that, if I understand it correctly, it is said
that the states may not forbid an abortion if that abortion is necessary to
preserve the life or the health of the mother and that it outright buys the
World Health Organization's definition of health. The WHO definition
says that health is a state not just of the absence of disease but involving
the presence of a sense of well being. So that if one doesn't have a sense of
well being, one is ill by WHO standards. It mentions such things as stress-
ful circumstances and all these kinds of things. I would simply say that as
a result of that, it is reasonable to say that any woman walking into a
doctor's office gives you ipso facto e-vidence that she is ill. If the situation
is stressful enough that she walks into an obstetrician's office you know she
meets the criteria for abortion right there. I am reminded of the statements
that were made after rhythm became an acceptable method of family
planning "for serious reasons," as I think it was said in the Vatican, the
question then became how could the confessor know whether there were
"serious reasons." I think the standard statement was made "You may
assume that there are serious reasons if they practice it, because nobody
would do it for the heck of it." It has that kind of inherent logic in it. I
think that this is the logic which many, or most, obstetricians would in-
deed use in deciding in an abortion or request as to whether there was or
was not "sufficient reason." They would in essence say: well, there must
be a proven need or they wouldn't be here.
All right, to go back for a moment to the matter of the start of life.
To say what has been said again and again that we know very well when
life starts and it is at conception. It becomes clearer by the day as we begin
to get into the business of in vitro fertilization-fertilization in test tubes.
One can say it until one is blue in the face that if you start with a test tube
full of sperm and a test tube full of ova you can wait till Hell freezes
over-nothing is going to happen until you start mixing your two test tubes
worth, in which case you're in business. So from the laboratory point of
view the start of life is eminently clear. As a consequence, I and many
others have resented the fact that this question of when human life starts
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has been totally falsified. The issue really is when human value or human
dignity or soul, or whatever you call it, starts. The issue is not when
biological life starts because we know it. We know it's human. Just because
there's nothing great about being human, it's just a category you are as-
signed to that differentiates you from cockroaches, elephants, cats, rats,
monkeys and so forth. It's purely a biological term or category but unfor-
tunately again the word human is being confused with such things as
"value", "dignity", "soul" or "worthiness of protection" or with "person"
or whatever else you want to call it. So I don't think there really is a
biological debate as to when life starts, but there is a value debate as to
when life starts. And, you know, I repeatedly said I don't want to prostitute
the medical language to solve a problem that is not of biological origin.
There are some new movements on foot. It's my understanding that Dr.
Watson, Nobel prize winner of Watson and Crick, has come out with a
statement that human life doesn't start until the third day after birth. The
third he wants, I think, for quality testing. I understand Crick has just
come out with a statement that people beyond the age of 80 should not be
called human. And the only optimistic note there is, is that I think Justice
Douglas is beginning to push 80, isn't he? Getting close to that at any rate.
But these statements are nonsensical from the biological point of view and
I hope that nobody will confuse the biological with the broader issue of
whom shall we protect, attach value to and so forth.
Let me talk for a moment about consequences of the Supreme Court
decisions. I foresee two, one of which is already upon us, and I want to
spend some time on it. First is the problems of hiring and firing in medical
schools, in hospitals and so forth. In which, if I understand it correctly, it's
fairly clear that one may not be fired for not performing an abortion. It is
less clear to me whether one may not be hired. And at any rate I think it's
well to know what the British experience has been. What one does is to
not hire physicians who won't do abortions rather than firing those who are
already in the hospital and who don't want to do them. So I think it will
be the hiring practices that are worth watching and medical schools are
beginning to ask such questions. By the same token I think there is a sticky
point which is that one ought to be very careful in Catholic hospitals that
one doesn't get into the bind of asking the same question, and then being
told that we do it for opposite reasons.
The second and very obvious consequence that bursts open immedi-
ately is what are going to be the consequences for fetal physiology research?
Let me quickly go over that. In what way would we use fetuses for research?
There has been a British committee headed by Sir John Peel that had to
deal with precisely this issue. And it's foreseen that the fetus is now being
used for research in four different ways. One, the fetus inside the uterus of
the mother can be used for developmental research by administering to the
mother a number of drugs and seeing what effect this will have on the
fetus. So that is drug testing in utero, if you like. The British, incidentally,
have objected to that on the grounds that the mother might want, at the
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last moment, to change her mind occasionally, and since you then have
already given the drug the damage has been done. The second type of
research involves the use of tissues from dead fetuses after abortion. I said
from dead fetuses. And nowhere have I heard great opposition to that.
The third one involves the use of tissues of the live fetus, removed from
the live fetus, for transplantation into live newborns. The tissue that is
most likely to be used, and has been used, is the thymus gland of the fetus
which provides immunity to children who are terribly prone to die by
infection. So that what is beginning to happen is that the thymus gland is
excised from fetuses produced from abortions while they are still alive and
then transplanted into newborn children to give them immunity to infec-
tions. The last kind of experimentation is experimentation on the fetus
alive and removed by hysterotomy. So these would be fetuses procured
between the thirteenth and twenty-sixth week of pregnancy. It is said they
cannot survive, and these fetuses are then used, by and large, to determine
what the action of certain agents is within the bodies of developing chil-
dren. Some interesting questions are arising within NIH on the count. I'm
sure you've read the newspaper reports that said that a number of high
school kids marched to NIH to protest the use of live fetuses. When the
story first broke in the Washington Post, in a moment of panic, some high
officials at NIH stated that NIH did not intend to finance any such re-
search. Now I would simply tell you that you can forget that statement.
Just simply because there will be a lot of pressure from fetal physiologists
or people from the scientific community to use the fetus and the issue is
up for grabs. At the present time the issue comes in the context of a broader
one, which I think you ought to be aware of as lawyers.
The whole of NIH and the scientific community is rethinking the
matter of consent for experimentation in medicine. I suppose it goes along
with consumerism, truth-in-packaging, truth in lending, and so forth, and
this is just one symptom of the whole movement. Informed consent in
adults, people haven't had much difficulty with at NIH technically, or any
place else. The issue obviously concerns children, the retarded, the incom-
petent in some form or another, and who shall give consent on their behalf.
In general, the approach has been that the next of kin, or parent, gives the
consent for the use of his or her child for research studies. The interesting
issue in this approach is that it is assumed the mother and/or father are
most likely to have the interest of that child at heart. The tricky issue in
the fetus is, of course, that the parents have given very clear indications
that they do not have the interest of the fetus at heart or they would not
have aborted it. So now, the tricky issue comes from whom would one then
get consent? And certainly, the parents are no longer an adequate group
since they have just shown that they don't fall within the category of
adequate protectors of the fetus, if you like. I wonder, and sort of look at
Bob Byrn, whether someday somebody is going to constitute himself a
guardian ad litem for an already aborted fetus, alive, to protect him from
experimentation because I think it would be a very interesting case. It
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would be interesting because you could no longer postulate that that fetus
was infringing against a maternal interest. It is now outside the mother,
so it strikes me that it is not invading its privacy, it's not hurting its life,
it's not hurting its health, and it seems to me that a court could not hide
behind conflict resolution. It would now have to call the shot directly. Yes,
it is a live human being, or no, it is not a live human being. And I could
foresee that a whole new story might arise. It's interesting that a group of
Christian ethicists, 90% Protestant I think, have signed a statement that
is being sent to NIH, saying that there are serious ethical problems in-
volved in the use of the live fetus that ought to be widely discussed.
Now, increasingly, in recent years, NIH has followed a second princi-
ple and has asked itself the question: what can parents ethically give
consent for in their children? And the tendency has been to say that if the
child, itself, did not stand to benefit from that experiment as much as it
stood to lose, the consent of the parent will not be considered to be suffi-
cient. So increasingly there has been a suggestion that says there has to
be an ombudsman introduced someplace in the whole system of consent
giving. I think NIH will go for the ombudsman principle. It's interesting
because this is sometimes called the beneficial research principle. There
has been an increasing tendency to prohibit what is called non-beneficial
research. That is to say, research from which one cannot postulate that
that child itself might gain as much benefit as loss. From that point of
view, there is a very interesting editorial in the mid-April New England
Journal of Medicine, a very prestigious journal. Written by its editor, Dr.
Inglefinger of Boston, it asks for a reversal of this rule, stating in essence
that society has the right to the information and that panels of many
talents will be able to decide whether the child will be used experimentally
or not. This is the first indication that I have that a serious journal is now
saying that one may proceed with experimentation on children even with-
out parental consent. That a panel can give consent rather than somebody
who stands in loco parentis of the person. If that were to be what is upon
us, then I think it would be a very marked change. It is interesting in
Watergate days, that one might actually "bug" somebody without consent.
Now I stand surprised how many people are terribly upset about Water-
gate, and "bugging" without consent, who would be perfectly willing to
"bug" human fluid or body, in the absence of consent. But it is an issue
which is upon us, and I think a very serious one.
Now a short word about things like constitutional amendments and
posting notices in hospitals. Anything that deals with any human right
amendment I hope will take into account the fact that one in two hundred
pregnancies ends in an ectopic pregnancy, a pregnancy in tube, which
factually everybody would remove. That represents about 16,000 cases per
year in the United States in which no Catholic hospital would hesitate to
do that kind of abortion-interruption of pregnancy prior to the twentieth
week. So I think one has to be careful when one says Catholic hospitals do
no abortions. We do no direct abortions as perceived in moral theology. We
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do do abortions in the medical sense of interrupting pregnancies prior to
the twentieth week, when those pregnancies are sitting in the tube. Now
why do I put in a note of caution on that point? I think the suggeston has
been made that we should post on hospital walls a statement that says that
this hospital, and this physician refuse to do abortions on grounds of con-
science or some wording of that kind. I would like to ask of the lawyers
what the implications would be of having such a notice on our walls if we
did do ectopic pregnancies? Would somebody then say: you've broken your
own statement of conscience. Does that have any legal implications or not?
So it is not something I like to see us rushing into because you don't want
to hamper our ability to at least deal with the ectopic pregnancy. Now in
terms of our doing abortions of other kinds, I think we can by and large
probably get away without doing these. I have predicted, in print, that the
first case that will be tried will be a lady twelve weeks pregnant, poor, in
a town where the Catholic hospital is the only one. Why do I say twelve
weeks? Because it will be said in the court that if this isn't done at once
she will fall in the thirteen week category in which case the procedure
becomes more dangerous and she is, in other words, in jeopardy of her life
by virtue of it not being done immediately. I have suggested flippantly that
we set up a hospital travel fund so that, if such a case hits, we ship it out
and pay if necessary for the poor person, the trip to the next hospital. In
general, let me say one other thing, which is that one of the key issues that
needs to be thought about, and it will be a long term debate, is the dangers
and the perniciousness involved in the World Health Organization's defini-
tion of "health". It's something to which I heartily subscribed in one of my
do-good liberal 1950 days in which I was all gung-ho on being everybody's
brother. When you begin to think that through, as to what the implications
are for the use of medical technology to insure a sense of well-being, then
it's like saying you're in the business of trying, through medical technol-
ogy, to create a discomfort-free society. This would, I think, perfectly
justify abortion, deception to keep patient's comfort, wholesale drugs to
keep patients' comfort, euthanasia, etc.
In brief, I have come to the conclusion that the only discomfort-free
situation is death. I hope these comments have been of some help in your
deliberations.
